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1. Introduction
In his analysis of the 19th century money market "Lombard Street", Bagehot wrote:
"We cannot appeal, therefore, to experience to prove the safety of our system as it now is,
for the present magnitude of our system is entirely new. Obviously a system may be fit to regulate a
few millions and yet quite inadequate when it is set to cope with many millions".
Magnitude and speed of capital flows are key elements of the fmancial global crisis which
began with a minor event, the devaluation of Thailand's national currency, and which has spread by
direct or indirect mechanisms to different parts of the world. The fmancial crisis has undergone
four distinct stages. The first corresponds to the Asian crisis. The second stage, compounded by
oversupply of world oil, is characterized by depressed prices of basic cornmodities and thus by
dec1ining terms of trade for developing economies. The third stage, that of the Russian crisis,
"raised the spectre of sovereign default." The fourth stage corresponds to Brazil's abandonment of
a choice of nominal exchange rate to anchor inflation.
As a consequence of these transmission mechanisms and as a result of policy-induced
macroeconomic adjustment decisions, Latin America's GDP growth decreased in 1998 and is
expected to further dec1ine in 1999.
Regional trade agreements are not immune to economic performance. Indeed, external or
internal changes in macroeconomic variables affect the volume and direction of trade between
cornmercial partners. More important, trade and policy reform commitments may be altered when
the conditions that generated such agreements are liable to change, especially when these changes
are felt asyrnmetrically. In the process of formalizing negotiations for a free trade area of the
Americas, it becomes imperative to provide a primer on the effects of the global financial crisis in
the region.
The paper is divided in seven sectiollS. Following this introduction, the second and third
sections provide a brief overview of the global fmancial crisis and address the question of the
relationship between regional trade agreements and macroeconomic performance. The fourth
section centres on balance of trade effects of the global fmancial crisis. In this section, both import
and export sides of the balance of trade are considered. Regarding the export side, quantity
(external demand)and price (real exchange rate) factors are distinguished. The fifth section focuses
on financial issues, particularly capital flow behaviour and the international debt market. The
section ends with a brief discussion on vulnerability as measured by external debt and with
sovereign risk indicators for 1999. Section six examines the fiscal dependency on export and import
taxes for individual Latin American and Caribbean countries and for regional blocs. The
conc1usions and fmal reflections are presented in the last section.
22. The financial crisis: a brief overview
The global financial crisis which began with a minor event, the devaluation of Thailand's national
currency -the baht- in July 1997, has had important unprecedented contagion effects on both big
and smaU economies throughout the world. The financial crisis has proceeded in a sequential
fashion in four distinct but interrelated steps. The first one is the Asian crisis proper
(May-November, 1997); the second is referred to as the terms of trade effect (December-July, 1998),
the third is the Russian crisis (July-October, 1998) and finaUy the Brazilian crisis
(December-February, 1999).
The Asian crisis affected cornmodity markets by depressing demand for basic cornmodities
and as a result of East Asian countries' devaluations of their currencies which measured in real
terms reached in sorne cases more than 170%. The decline in basic cornmodity prices has placed
fiscal constraints on sorne countries whose governmental budget equilibrium depends on export
prices of basic cornmodities.
AIso following the outbreak of the Asian cnSIs there were important changes in the
composition of international investor's portfolios. International investors were inclined to reduce
their holdings of emergent market financial instruments with lower degree of risk vulnerability such
as United States treasury bonds. Moreover, they were forced to seU their Latin American portfolio to
.. offset losses in Asian holdings and to meet redemptions in their portfolios.
In addition to the impact on the availability and variability of foreign capital flows which
was clearly reflected in exchange and interests rate variations (see table 1), the Russian default
compounded investor feared sovereign global default. Sorne countries have been partIy shielded
from the effects of the financial turmoil either by sound policies or by the lack of developed
money markets. However, most countries have experienced increasing current account and
budget deficits in the region, as reduced access to international capital markets from September
1998 on became a reality.
The policy response has varied between tightening fiscal and monetary policies to achieve
the required adjustment with the concomitant associated cost in terms of output and employment or
adapting passively to the situation. The second option has often resulted from underlying political
pressures and has increased external vulnerability.
Overall the effects of the financial crisis, whether direct or induced through contractionary
fiscal and monetary policies, have had an important effect in macro variables. In particular the
current and future rates of economic growth are expected to decline (see table 2). The slowdown in
growth is not and will not be the same for all the countries of the region.
3Table 1
VOLATILITY OF EXCHANGE AND INTEREST RATES FOR SELECTED
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1996-1999
Basic cornrnodity Brazil crisis
Asian crisis price decline Russian crisis December 1998-
Country May-November, 1997 December-July, 1997 July-October, 1998 Februarv1999
E I E I E I E I
Argentina O 2.23 O 2.31 O 2.45 O 2.08
Brazil 0.01 8.37 0.12 9.6 0.016 5.17 0.47 5.3
Chile 3.67 3.22 8.17 2.4 4.9 5.06 14.5 4.73
Colombia 90.9 0.75 39.6 7.12 97.67 1.3 16.52 2.08
Costa Rica 4.29 0.13 5.211 0.31 2.57 O 3.17 O
Ecuador 135.1 1.76 382.67 2.7 641.93 2.89· 1,175 5.68
Mexico 0.17 0.76 0.32 0.64 0.62 2.45 0.11 2
Panama ... 0.21 ... 0.09 ... 0.08 oo • 0.06
Peru 5.47 0.62 76.4 0.97 0.06 0.76 0.14 0.77
Uruguay 0.17 3.1 0.18 2.96 0.04 1 0.11 1.19
Venezuela 6.01 2.73 17.71 8.62 8.60 2.58 6.43 3.51.
Source: ECLAC (1999); BPC securities (1999). Note: E = national currency dollar exchange rate;
I = interest rate. Volatility is measured by the standard deviation.
.
Table 2
LATIN AMERICA. SELECTED INDICATORS, 1996-1999
1996 1997 1998 1999
Internal performance
Real GDP 3.7 5.2 2.1 -1.5
Domestic Demand 3.9 6.8 1.9 -4.0
Consumer prices 16.2 8.5 8.3 12.8
External performance
Export Volume 10.5 12.3 7.3 7.8
Import Volume 12.6 17.1 5.4 -3.7
Terms of Trade 1.9 -2.9 -9.0 -3.3
Current account balance -2.0 -3.1 -4.3 -3.8
External debt 225 206 231 229
Interest payments 14.7 13.9 15.9 16.0
Source: Institute of International Finance (UF) (1999).
For 1999, it is expected that most of the decline in output growth will result mainly from
Brazil's economic woes. Brazil underwent a devaluation in mid-January as authorities were forced
to abandon, due to excessive reserve losses, an exchange rate policy targeted at anchoring inflation
to the nominal exchange rateo
4Brazilian GDP is expected to fall by 5%as the government implements measures oriented to
achieve a fiscal surplus and macroeconomic balance. Spillover effects through trade linkages or
borrowing spreads have affected other countries in the region. From a financial point of view
Argentina and Colombia have been affected as national authorities raised short term interest rates.
In Argentina prime rates of interest increased by five percentage points following the Real
devaluation.
From a trade perspective, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina are likely to be affected as
their respective exports to Brazil represent 25%, 34% and 28% of their total external sales for
1998. Other countries are likely to be better positioned to withstand the "Samba Effect" as their
trade linkages are not significant. Colombia, Ecuador or Mexico are cases in point. In particular,
Mexico is shielded from regional disturbances by its trade relationship with the United States. The
United States market share of Mexican exports amounts to 82%.
3. Regional Trade Agreements and Macroeconomic Performance
Tables 3 to 6 show intra-regional exports as a percentage of total exports by partner country for the
Central American Cornmon Market (CACM), Mercosur, Andean Cornmunity and G-3 countries.
In the case of the Central American Cornmon Market (CACM) and viewed from the export
side, intra-regional trade accounts for 17% and 12% from the import side. These percentages have
remained almost constant throughout the 1990's. The export and import dynamics have fluctuated
significantly and do not seem to exhibit a pattern. The average rate of growth of exports is 14% and
14.7% for imports for the period 1994-1998. The standard deviation is 5 and 9 respectively.
Table 3 also highlights the importance of the bilateral trade relationship between Guatemala
and El Salvador for the CACM. Close to 20% (12%) of all Salvadoran (Guatemalan) exports go to
the Guatemalan (Salvadoran market).
In a similar fashion the bilateral trade relationship between Brazil and Argentina is
fundamental to the workings of the Mercosur. Moreover, in this case also Paraguay and Uruguay
depend heavily on the Brazilian market as an outlet for their exports. On average between 1990 and
1998, 34% of all Paraguayan and 31 % of Uruguayan exports were destined for the Brazilian
market (see table 4, below). In Mercosur intra-regional trade accounts for 26% of total exports.
In the case of the Andean Cornmunity, there are important relationships between Bolivia and
Peru and between Colombia and Venezuela. However, their trade linkages are not as strong as
those of the CACM or Mercosur countries. Andean Cornmunity countries have in fact strengthened
ties with other individual countries or with other trade agreements. Colombia and Venezuela have
formed the G-3 group with Mexico (see table 6 for intra-regional flows) while Bolivia has become
an associate member of Mercosur.
Intra-regional trade accounts only for 14% of total trade. During the 1990's trade growth
has proceeded at a steady pace aboye 20% between 1990-1997. During 1998, Bolivian exports to
other members of the Andean Cornmunity increased by 8.6% (mostly soy exports) as did Peruvian
external sales. Ecuador increased its exports by 5%, while both Colombia and Venezuela
5experienced declines in their rates of growth of exports. In particular depressed demand in
Venezuela affects Colombian manufacturing exports in a significant way.
Table 3
CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET. INTRA-REGIONAL EXPORTS
AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS, 1990-1998
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Costa Rica
1990 2.47 3.27 1.26 1.85
1993 2.27 2.16 1.90 3.07
1995 2.46 1.76 0.67 3.44
1996 2.40 1.15 0.76 3.79
1997 2.37 1.89 0.74 3.73
1998 2.47 1.75 0.77 3.42
Average Share 2.41 2.05 1.02 3.22
El Salvador
1990 8.19 17.24 2.9 1.54
1993 8.96 21.85 6.51 9.75
1995 8.79 14.69 6.89 4.50
1996' 9.12 20.59 9.51 5.20
1997 4.51 8.85 2.59
1998 4.61 8.63 2.66
Average Share 7.36 15.31 4.30 3.54
Guatemala
1990 6.19 12.05 3.18 2.68
1993 7.08 14.23 5.74 4.10
1995 5.22 13.89 6.56 3.67
1996 4.72 10.77 6.31 3.69
1997 3.47 9.76 5.61 2.65
1998 2.94 8.03 4.87 2.20
Average Share 4.94 11.46 5.36 3.16
Honduras
1990 0.12 1.56 1.44 0.12
1993 0.36 2.25 1.88 0.44
1995 0.52 0.81 2.28 0.62
1996 0.53 2.59 1.70 0.61
1997 0.46 1.69 0.57
1998 1.54 5.33 1.89
Average Share 0.59 1.20 2.37 0.71
Nicaragua
1990 4.91 3.07 3.99 2.76
1993 4.18 6.08 1.14 2.66
1995 3.23 7.07 1.41 1.01
1996 2.90 7.89 1.29 0.97
1997 2.73 7.29 0.89 0.93
1998 3.67 7.40 0.91 0.96
Average Share 3.60 6.47 1.61 1.55
Source: DOrS Yearbook, IMF (1990-1998). Several issues.
6TabIe 4
MERCOSUR. INTRA-REGIONAL EXPORTS AS PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL EXPORTS, 1990-1998
Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay
Argentina
1990 11.52 1.19 2.13
1993 21.45 2.07 3.90
1995 29.48 1.31 3.16
1996 27.80 1.06 3.05
1997 27.57 2.18 2.71
1998 28.07 2.20 3.11
Average Share 24.32 1.67 3.01
Brazil
1990 2.05 1.21 0.94
1993 9.44 2.48 2.00
1995 8.67 2.79 1.74
1996 10.83 ,2.78 1.70
1997 13.52 2.61 1.61
1998 13.71 2.46 1.70
Average Share 9.7 2.39 1.6
Paraguay
1990 5.17 29.35 1.13
1993 8.46 27.99 0.91
1995 8.07 40.26 3.03
1996 11.0 44.22 2.26
1997 12.47 38.46 1.64
1998 22.90 25.47 2.15
Average Share 11.3 34.29 1.85
Uruguay
1990 4.74 29.25 0.35
1993 18.83 21.81 0.95
1995 12.69 33.10 1.18
1996 11.35 34.67 2.09
1997 12.67 33.61 2.17
1998 15.78 34.37 2.11
Average Share 12.68 31.14 1.48
Source: DOTS Yearbook, IMF (1990-1998). SeveraI issues.
7Table 5
ANDEAN COMMUNITY. INTRA-REGIONAL EXPORTS AS PRCENTAGE
OF TOTAL EXPORTS, 1990-1998
Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Pero Venezuela
Bolivia
1990 0.43 5.74 0.33
1993 4.60 0.87 9.83 0.25
1995 5.42 0.59 12.46 0.53
1996 9.54 0.58 11.10
1997 6.87 0.28 12.39 0.11
1998 7.69 0.30 13.85 0.11
Average Share 5.76 0.5 10.90 0.27
Colombia
1990 0.07 1.11 1.32 3.02
1993 0.24 2.99 2.82 9.63
1995 0.24 4.25 5.71 9.49
1996 0.29 4.02 5.86 7.45
1997 0.30 4.05 2.94 7.50
1997 0.32 4.16 1.01 7.70
Average Share 0.24 3.43 3.28 7.47
Ecuador
1990 1.18 5.08 0.66
1993 0.07 4.72 4.35 0.33
1995 0.09 5.78 1.58 0.78
1996 0.08 5.68 0.97 0.67
1997 6.24 1.60 0.67
1998 6.44 1.73 0.28
Average Share 0.08 5.01 2.6 0.57
Pero
1990 0.61 2.90 0.98 1.68
1993 1.82 2.48 1.33 2.17
1995 1.40 2.19 0.85 2.94
1996 1.74 2.07 1.21 2.15
1997 1.65 2.31 1.66 2.07
1998 2.07 2.86 1.94 2.40
Average Share 1.55 2.47 1.33 2.24
Venezuela
1990 0.00 1.88 0.39 0.16
1993 0.01 5.68 0.29 0.60
1995 0.06 6.40 1.23 1.77
1996 0.05 5.18 1.07 1.90
1997 0.08 5.70 1.03 1.43
1998 0.10 6.84 1.21 1.83
Average Share 0.05 5.28 0.87 1.28
Source: DOTS Yearbook, IMF (1990-1998). Several issues.
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Regional trade agreements are not immune from macroeconomic performance.
Disturbances, whether domestically or externally generated, can result in fluctuations in policy
variables which may cause trade distortions.
Graphs 1 to 3 show bilateral real exchange rate variations in four selected cases, Mexico-
United States; Brazil-Argentina; Guatemala-El Salvador; Colombia-Venezuela, and the
corresponding export and import behaviour. In these examples the trade deficit behaviour over time
responds to real exchange rate performance.
In the case of Mexico-United States the devaluation of the peso in December 1994 coincides
with an increase in the real exchange rate (Le., depreciation of the currency) which leads to a
change from a trade balance deficit to a surplus in the first quarter of 1995 (this is shown in Graph
1 by a verticalline). For Argentina-Brazil, the increase in the real exchange rate (Le., depreciation
of the currency) of Argentina relative to Brazil around the fourth quarter of 1994 is accompanied by
an increase in exports and a decrease in imports. Colombia-Venezuela illustrates the opposite case.
A decrease in the exchange rate Colombia-Venezuela (Le., appreciation of the currency) is
associated with an increase of imports over exports (a widening of the trade deficit). Finally, the
stability of the Guatemala-El Salvador exchange rate goes hand in hand with the stability of the
























Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (1999); DOTS Yearbook, IMF (1995-1998).
Note: The verticalline in both ra hs corres onds to the first uarter of 1995.
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Graph 4: Colombia-Venezuela real exchange rate and bilateral exports and imports
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These examples, as well as more recent ones such as the effects of the Brazilian devaluation
on the automobile industry or the consequences of slack demand in Venezuela for Colombian
manufacturing exports, illustrate the importance of maintaining stability of basic macroeconomic
variables.
They also provide a reminder that trade policy and trade commitments are not independent
from macroeconomic performance. According to Eichengreen (1998), following Argentina's
implementation of the convertibility plan, the peso-real real exchange rate appreciated sharply. As
Argentina registered a bilateral trade deficit with Brazil, in 1992 the authorities imposed
anti-dumping measures and safeguard c1auses against exports of farm machinery, spark plugs, and
steel among other products. The January 1999 real devaluation led to expectations that similar
measures would be undertaken by Argentina. And indeed, Argentina has announced higher tariffs
on Latin American imported textiles. This has highlighted the fragility of the Mercosur trade
arrangements and compromises.
If regional agreements were able, during the early 1990's, to make progress by reducing
trade barriers amongst members and engaging into significant tariff reductions schedules with third
countries, (as shown in table 7 below) it was in part the result of capital inflow availability,
investors' so-called 'animal spirits', world economic stability and prospects of future growth.
Table 7
AVERAGE TARIFF RATES FOR SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
Pre-reform
Average Duty Rate and
Country Average Duty Average Duty Rate 1995
Rate
Duty Ranks 1999
Argentina 44 14 14.1
Bolivia 10 9.7
Brazil 69 13 15
Colombia 24 12
Costa Rica 52 5-20 0-16
Chile 10
Dominican Republic 17.5 17.3
Ecuador 17 14
El Salvador 48 5-20 0-15
Guatemala 50 5-20 0-15
Honduras 41 5-20 0-15
Mexico 23.8 13.7 16.1
Paraguay 19 9 12
Peru 17
Uruguay 27 10 7
Venezuela 17 12
Source: Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) (1999).
In this sense, and for the reasons already stated, it becomes important to analyse, in the
light of the Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiation efforts, the effects of the financial crisis
on Latin American and Caribbean economies. Moreover, the ongoing negotiations make it
12
important to understand how economies, big and small, react to external shocks. Finally, the
analysis of transmission and propagation mechanisms may facilitate the task of outlining potential
policy options.
4. Balance of trade effects
The economies of Latin America and the Caribbean are most1y open economies and as a result are
dependent on balance of trade performance. The global [mancial crisis can affect both sides of a
balance of trade accounting. On the one hand, changes in external demand, and in competitive
positions in third markets affect exports (Le., injections). On the other hand, variations in income are
likely to determine import behaviour (Le., leakages). In this section the effects of the global [mancial
crisis are ascertained by focussing on external demand, real exchange rate appreciation and import
changes relative to income variations.
a) External demand
When analysing the external demand effect of the Asian crisis, it is important to distinguish
between a direct and an indirect external demand effect. The former effect refers to the potential
decrease in Central American and Caribbean exports to East Asian countries that have experienced
substantial decreases in GDP. These are Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, South Korea
(See Table 8) and are referred to in this paper as Asian Crisis Countries (ACC, hereafter) for
analytical purposes.
For 1998 the average GDP growth for ACC declined by -6.7%. In 1999 GDP growth is
expected to reach -0.,5%. However its effect on regional exports is not significant. The ACC average
market share for the years 1992-1998 amounts to 0.14% for the MCCA; 0.19% for the G-3; 1.43%
for the Andean Cornmunity; 0.39% for Caribbean Cornmunity (CARICOM) countries. In the cases of
the Mercosur and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the ACC share is higher,
3.22% and 5.11 % respectively (see Tables 8 and 9).
Table 8




































Source: ECLAC (1998), Mexico City. 1999, Economic outIook for East Asia, IDE/Japan. Dec 1998. IMF, May
1999, World Economic Outlook.
Note: Figures in parenthesis correspond for 1998 and 1999 correspond to IMF forecasts. The figures that are
not in parenthesis for 1998 and 1999 correspond to IDE/Japan forecasts.
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Table 9
ACC MARKET SHARE OF SELECTED REGIONAL BLOC EXPORTS 1990-1998
Region/Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998*
NAFTA 4.91 5.08 5.33 6.20 6.11 4.92 3.24
CMCA 0.27 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.06
G-3 0.15 0.24 0.17 0.23 0.25 0.15 0.14
Mercosur 3.31 3.26 3.19 3.91 4.03 2.92 1.95
Andean Community 0.66 1.73 1.76 1.71 1.59 1.24 1.32
CARICOM 0.90 0.70 0.65 0.33 0.10 0.04 0.04
Source: Module for the Analysis ofGrouth oflnternational Cornmerce (MAGIC) (1997). ECLAC, Mexico City.
Note: ACC = Asian Crisis Countries. * preliminary, third quarter.
While the direct external demand effect of the crisis on the exports of those economies
analysed in this paper is unimportant, this is not the case of the indirect effect. The latter refers to a
potential decrease in their main trading partner's income. Table 10 shows the main trading partners
of Latin American and selected Caribbean countries.
Loóking at the bilateral trade relation from the export side, the United States and Germany are
Central America and Panama's main trading partners and during 1991-1997 accounted on average for
40% and 15% of aH external sales respectively. Also table 6 shows the importance of intra-regional
trade partnership. This is clearly reflected in the case of El Salvador and Guatemala.
In the case of the selected Caribbean countries, and with the exception of the Dominican
Republic, the United Kingdom is the leading trade partner foHowed by the United States (29% and
28% respectively of export market share).
In the case of South American countries the United States account for 35% of aH exports. As
mentioned in the previous section bilateral trade relationships are also significant. Argentina-Brazil,
Paraguay-Brazil and Uruguay-Brazil are cases in point.
Table 11 presents the other side of the picture. It shows the percent import share of total
Ullited States imports for individual Latin American and Caribbean countries and for regional trading
blocs. The table also includes two non-grouped countries, Chile and the Dominican Republic.
Mexico represents in 1998 10.4% of aH United States imports, while the rest of the countries
import share is meagre. Brazil accounts for 1% of total imports which is equivalent to the Central
American Cornmon Market share. 1
The annex shows the importance for Mexico of the rest of Latin American and Caribbean
countries as a source of its imports.
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Table 10
AVERAGE EXPORT SHARES OF CENTRAL AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN
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Source: External Trade Data Bank for Latin America and the Caribbean (BADECEL). DOTS Yearbook,
IMF(I997). In the case of South American countries export share was computed only for 1996.
16
Table 11
UNITED STATES IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND THE CARIBBEAN
BY COUNTRY AND REGIONAL BLOC. MARKET SHARE, 1993-1998
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
NAFTA
Mexico 6.9 7.5 8.3 9.2 9.9 10.4
CACM
Costa Rica 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.3
El Salvador 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.16
Guatemala 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.23
Honduras 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.28
Nicaragua 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05
Total 0.74 0.72 0.79 0.87 0.97 1.01
Mercosur
Argentina 0.21 0.26 0.24 0.29 0.26 0.25
Brazil 1.29 1.31 1.19 1.11 1.11 1.11
Paraguay 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02
Uruguay 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Total 1.54 1.62 1.48 1.45 1.41 1.38
Andean Community
Bolivia 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02
Colombia 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.51
Ecuador 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.19
Peru 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.22
Venezuela 1.4 1.26 1.31 1.63 1.55 1.02
Total 2.32 2.17 2.26 2.61 2.56 1.96
CARICOM
Antigua & Barbuda 0.003 0.001 0.00 0.001 0.001 0.000
Bahamas 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Barbados 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004
Belize 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.007
Dominica 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Grenada 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Guyana 0.002 0.02 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.015
Jamaica 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.082
Saint Kitts & Nevis 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Saint Vincent & 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.00 0.001
Grenadines
St Lucia 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.002
Suriname 0.010 0.007 0.0013 0.012 0.011 0.012
Trinidad & Tobago 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14
Total 0.36 0.36 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.29
Non grouped
Chile 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.27
Dominican Republic 0.16 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.50 0.49
Total 0.41 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.76
Source: ECLAC (1999), DOTS Yearbook, IMF (1999).
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The effect that a decrease in the demand of a major trading partner for Latin American and
Caribbean products can have on the performance of these economies can be roughIyapproximated by
obtaining an estimate of the percentage decrease in imports that would result from a given percent
decline in that major trading partner's output.
This estimate, known as the import elasticity of income, was calculated, as a preliminary
exercise, for the United States and Central American and Caribbean countries by taking into account
only total United States imports for the years 1950-1997. Then as a closer approximation only the main
products that the United States imports from both Central America and the Caribbean were taken into
account in the calculations. These main products are 69 in number for both Central America and the
Caribbean and represent 60% of the United States imports from both regions (see Table 12).
Table 12
UNITED STATES IMPORT ELASTICITY OF INCOME
Total United States Imports
1.9
Main Products from Central America Main Products from the Caribbean
3.6 1.1
Source: National Trade Data Bank, 1999 and Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1999.
As table 12 indicates the overall import elasticity of income for the all United States products is
1.9. 2 This means that a decrease in say 1%output will result in a fall of 2% of all imports.
For the main products from Central America and the Caribbean the import elasticity of
imports is much higher for the Central American (3.6) than for Caribbean products (1.1). This
points to the fact that the Caribbean products as a whole are less prone to experience a decline due
to a decrease in United States output than Caribbean products (i.e., are less elastic). This may in
tum be explained by the composition of the set of United States import products from Central
America and the Caribbean. While close to 70% of the main products imported by the United States
from the Caribbean are petroleum products, these products represent 30% of aH Central American
countries exports to the United States. Additionally other important products for Central American
countries are textiles, and primary products.
Given the share of Central American and Caribbean products in United States imports
calculations were carried out which indicated that a 1% decrease in United States GDP would
translate into a decrease of 7% for Central American and 5% Caribbean exports to the United
States.
However, the United States and in general industrialized econornies have fared well and their
performance has not been affected by the global [mancial crisis. The exceptions are Japan, ltaly and
the United Kingdom. Japan's GDP growth has remained negative from the fourth quarter of 1997
throughout 1998. The United Kingdom and ltaly have registered marked decreases in their rate of
2 This estimate is close to Bairam (1997) who found that for 1970-1986 the import elasticity
of income of the United States was 2.22.
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growth by at least more than one percentage point between the third quarter of 1997 and the third
quarter of 1998.
Short terrn interest rates have for the most part remained at their 1997 levels or shown slight
decreases. Canada and once again the United Kingdom have been the exceptions to this trend as both
have increased their interest rates.
Table 13
GDP GROWTH AND SHORT TERM INTEREST RATES FOR INSDUSTRIALIZED
COUNTRIES, 1996-1999. QUARTERLY DATA
96.2 96.4 97.1 97.4 98.1 98.3 98.4 99.1
United States 3.9 3.9 4.1 3.8 4.2 3.5 4.3 4.0
5.4 5.4 5.4 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.2 4.9
Canada 0.9 1.8 2.7 4.4 3.9 2.3 2.8 oo'
4.9 3.2 3.1 4.1 4.8 5.3 5.1 5.0
Euro Area 1.4 2.0 1.6 3.1 3.7 2.8 2.3 oo.
4.6 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.4 oo.
Franee 1.0 2.4 1.1 3.0 3.8 2.9 2.8 oo.
4.0 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.5 oo.
Germany 1.0 2.1 2.5 2.3 3.4 2.7 1.8 oo.
3.3 3.2 3.2 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.5 oo.
lta1y 0.7 -0.2 -0.9 2.0 2.5 1.2 oo' oo.
9.1 7.6 7.3 6.4 6.0 4.9 4.0 oo'
JaPaI1 4.9 5.1 3.8 -0.8 -3.6 -3.1 -3.0 oo.
0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.5
UK 2.5 2.6 2.9 3.9 3.1 1.8 1.1 oo.
6.0 6.2 6.2 7.5 7.5 7.6 6.8 oo.
Souree: The Federal Reserve Bank of Sto Louis, May 1999.
b) Increased competition in export markets
Since the outbreak: of the Asian Crisis all ACC have experienced real exchange rate
depreciations reaching in sorne cases more than 200%, Le., Indonesia (see table 14 below).
Additionally the national currencies of Latin American countries and those of sorne Caribbean
countries have for the most part maintained their purchasing power (see tabIe 15 below). For both
reasons the resuIting reIative appreciation of the Latin American and Caribbean dollar exchange rate
with respect to ACC could by itself have adverse consequences for those specific products with which
these regions and the ACC compete in third product markets. Due to limitations in data availability this
section focuses on the United States product market.
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Table 14
ACC CURRENCIES REAL EXCHANGE RATES, 1996-1999
(1995 = 100)
Country 1996 1997 1998 1998 First Quarter
Indonesia 99.25 118.06 262.24 312.2
Malaysia 99.88 111.38 149.97 153.77
Prulippines 96.78 105.96 137.12 140.88
Thailand 98.93 118.57 147.04 169.54






Source: ECLAC, 1999; IMF 1999); Central Bank ofMalaysia (1999).
Table 15
SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN CURRENCIES REAL EXCHANGE RATES, 1996-1999
(195 = 100)
Country 1996 1997 1998 1998 First Quarter 1999 First Quarter
Argentina 102.7 104.5 105.3 104.6 106.4
Bolivia 96.8 97.9 96.9 95.5 99.4
Brazil 97.3 99.9 106.0 102.6 162.1
Colombia 97.2 92.4 100.5 97.7 ...
Costa Rica 101.2 102.4 103.1 102.6 103.8
Crule 99.9 97.6 103.4 102.4 108.7
El Salvador 93.7 91.8 91.0 91.5 90.8
Guatemala 96.4 90.6 90.7 90.2 98.0
Haiti 88.7 79.8 73.8 78.1 70.7
Honduras 102.7 97.2 89.4 92.8 87.8
Jamaica 86.0 76.5 73.9 75.4 79.1
Mexico 90.6 80.1 81.0 78.1 79.3
Nicaragua 102.7 107.7 108.4 109.3 108.3
Pero 100.0 102.9 107.0 103.4 121.4
Dominican Republic 98.9 96.8 100.4 97.1 101.7
Trinidad & Tobago 100.5 103.3 98.6 102.4 ...
Uruguay loo.7 101.8 103.6 102.8 105.3
Venezuela 121.5 97.0 81.4 84.7 74.6
Source: ECLAC, 1999; IMF (1999).
BIBLIOTECA NACIONES UNI:C.\S MEXrCO
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The effects of real exchange rate vanatlons for regional trade agreements positioning on
product competitiveness in the United States was ascertained through a by-product analysis at the two
digit level for main export products to the United States by regional trade bloc. These blocs comprise
the ACC, G-3, CACM, Andean Community, Mercosur, CARICOM. The products here considered
represent more than 50% of aH exported products to the United States.
Table 16
MAIN UNITED STATES MARKET SHARE IMPORT STRUCTURE FROM ACC, 1993-1998.
IN PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRlES' TOTAL EXPORTS
Product 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993
Electrical machinery 34.13 37.18 38.16 39.95 36.49 33.61
Nuelear reactors 21.92 16.64 18.08 16.34 14.25 12.99
Artieles of apparel 5.50 5.42 5.47 5.68 6.57 7.93
Artieles of apparel 4.15 3.66 3.21 3.30 3.69 4.08
Rubber and related artieles 3.06 3.21 3.74 3.84 3.15 3.41
Vehieles 2.67 3.05 3.18 2.85 3.13 2.09
Fumiture bedding 1.77 1.71 1.66 1.59 1.75 1.69
Source: MAGIC (1999).
Table 17
UNITED STATES MARKET SHARE IMPORT STRUCTURE FROM CACM, 1993-1998.
IN PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRIES' TOTAL EXPORTS
Product 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993
Artieles of apparel 29.87 27.97 23.42 20.01 16.58 14.40
Artieles of apparel 27.02 28.20 29.02 31.6 32.332 31.63
Nuts and fruits 8.55 9.26 11.39 12.81 13.27 14.60
Coffee 7.57 8.73 6.49 8.85 7.69 7.61
Electrical machinery 4.02 3.89 2.92 2.76 2.65 2.66
Nuelear reactors 3.93 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.5




UNITED STATES MARKET SHARE IMPORT STRUcrURE PROM G-3 COUNTRIES, 1993-1998.
IN PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRY'S TOTAL EXPORTS
Product 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993
Electrical machinery 23.76 21.07 20.77 21.96 23.60 21.65
Vehieles 15.55 14.92 15.73 13.87 11.84 12.02
Mineral fruits 14.04 21.57 22.35 20.79 21.71 26.17
Nuclear reactors 10.72 9.63 8.73 8.44 8.87 7.12
Artieles of apparel 3.78 3.18 2.79 2.72 2.49 2.47
Optical photography 3.06 2.53 2.60 2.84 3.04 2.64
Special c1assification 2.93 2.62 2.61 2.86 2.84 2.83
Artic1es of apparel 2.72 2.20 1.71 1.47 1.03 0.74
Source: MAGIC (1999.
Table 19
UNITED STATES MARKET SHARE IMPORT STRUcrURE PROM THE ANDEAN
COMMUNITY, 1993-1998. IN PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRY'S TOTAL EXPORTS
Product 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993
Mineral fuels and oils 59.09 67.50 69.75 64.0 61.0 67.43
Pearls 5.15 2.73 3.32 3.65 3.46 3.31
Coffee tea 4.77 4.60 3.38 4.61 4.98 2.66
Fish products 4.40 3.81 2.81 3.91 4.45 3.77
Fruit and nuts 3.0 2.27 2.10 2.72 3.25 3.33
Live tress 2.54 2.01 2.12 2.24 2.08 2.02
Artieles of apparel 2.08 1.45 1.14 1.57 1.56 1.14




UNITED STATES MARKET SHARE IMPORT STRUCfURE PROM MERCOSUR, 1993-1998.
IN PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRY'S TOTAL EXPORTS
Product 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993
Nuclear reactors 10.82 10.63 11.11 11.70 10.48 9.69
Iron and steel 9.55 9.5 9.94 9.92 9.0 5.99
Footwear 8.25 9.63 10.75 10.66 12.20 16.35
Aircraft 6.48 2.56 1.25 0.84 0.64 1.30
Mineral fuels 6.28 5.92 8.51 4.56 5.72 5.85
Electrical machinery 4.01 4.45 2.53 2.44 2.30 2.61
Vehicles 3.62 3.25 3.27 3.73 3.32 3.66
Pearls 3.56 3.88 3.28 3.13 4.62 2.47
Coffee and tea 3.52 4.20 2.59 4.25 4.42 2.80
Source: MAGIC (1999).
Table 21
UNITEDSTATES MARKET SHARE IMPORT STRUCfURE PROM CARICOM, 1993-1998.
IN PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRY'S TOTAL EXPORTS
Product 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993
Mineral fuels 20.91 23.95 18.76 18.15 26.45 30.62
Articles of apparel 16.04 16.49 17.56 19.03 14.92 14.04
Inorganic chemicals 14.80 13.09 16.32 17.21 12.39 8.30
Fish products 6.48 5.34 4.93 4.59 4.00 3.51
Ores 6.43 4.82 6.20 6.01 6.04 8.22
Articles of apparel 5.62 5.47 6.34 7.05 7.18 7.11
Organic chemicals 4.35 6.62 5.85 5.7 7.14 9.42
Special c1assification products 4.19 4.20 3.22 3.38 5.13 3.67
lron and steel 3.98 3.95 3.30 3.63 2.99 1.36
Source: MAGIC (1999).
As shown by tables 16 to 21 the exports of the regional blocs to the United States here
considered are concentrated in artic1es of apparel for the Central American cornmon market
followed by nuts, fruit and coffee. For G-3 countries, electrical machinery, vehic1es and mineral
fruits account for 53% of all exports to the United States.
Andean Cornmunity countries export mainly mineral fuels and oils (59% of total external
sales). Mercosur has a more diversified structure ranging from iron and steel to footwear and
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mineral fuels. Finally CARICOM countries' exports to the United States include mineral fuels,
articles of apparel and inorganic chemicals.
Given this global regional bloc export structure, ACC countries compete in electrical
machinery, articles of apparel, and vehicles. Table shows the main exporters of these products to
the United States as well as the evolution of market share of Latin American and Caribbean
countries' befare and after the fmancial crisis.
Table 22
UNITED STATES IMPORT MARKET SHARE OF SELECTED PRODUCTS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
AND IMPLICIT DUTY RATES, 1993-1998. IN PERCENTAGE
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Artieles of apparel, Chapter 61
1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.4
Mexico 2.9 4.2 7.2 9.7 11.6 13.02
5.5 2.8 1.4 0.6 0.5 0.5
Honduras 1.9 2.3 3.2 4.9 5.6 5.7
13.4 11.5 9.9 7.9 7.2 6.8
Korea
"" ..
6.7 6.0 4.5 3.6 3.6 4.2
23.3 24.3 23.6 23.7 24.0 25.2
Thailand 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.8
19.2 19.3 19.5 18.9 18.6 17.4
Dominican Republic 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.7
8.3 8.1 7.3 6.0 5.1 5.2
El Salvador 1.1 1.6 2.1 2.6 3.5 3.6
10.1 10.3 8.8 7.9 7.4 7.7
Artieles of apparel, Chapter 62
3.4 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.1
Mexico 5.1 6.0 8.1 10.0 11.9 13.8
6.6 5.8 1.9 1.2 1.3 1.2
Dominican Republic 5.1 5.5 5.6 5.2 5.8 5.4
7.6 8.0 7.7 8.2 8.5 8.6
Indonesia 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.3
19.7 19.4 18.6 17.7 17.4 17.5
Philippines 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.7
15.96 15.68 15.25 15.87 15.9 16.2
South Korea 6.3 5.5 4.6 3.8 3.4 3.6
16.24 16.5 16.7 16.12 15.9 16.1
Guatemala 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.7
10.6 11.32 11.11 11.15 12.5 13.3
Source: MAGIC (1999). Note: Implicit duty rates are shown in the second row.
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Table 23
UNITED STATES IMPORT MARKET SHARE OF SELECTED PRODUCTS BY COUNTRY
OF ORIGIN AND IMPLICIT IMPORT DUTIES, 1993-1998. IN PERCENTAGE
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Vehicles
14.6 14.6 13.8 13.3 13.2 13.5
Canada 39.3 39.3 39.7 39.2 38.6 37.4
0.07 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.05
Mexico 7.2 7.4 10.1 13.3 13.4 13.5
2.4 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.34 0.4
South Korea 1.04 1.68 1.77 1.92 1.83 1.55
2.6 2.53 2.51 2.51 2.49 2.48
Brazil 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.33 0.32 0.35
1.18 0.72 0.51 0.44 0.45 0.58
Venezuela 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.17
0.10 0.23 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.03
Machinery
13.4 14.2 15.4 14.5 14.0 13.9
Mexico 14.3 15.24 14.4 16.3 17.9 20.29
1.95 1.34 0.59 0.46 0.41 0.27
Japan 30.41 27.62 25.63 22.08 20.22 18.18
3.31 3.1 2.6 2.4 2.0 1.6
Canada 6.43 6.12 6.07 7.33 7.44 7.70
0.76 0.75 0.44 0.39 0.21 0.13
Malaysia 7.97 8.5 8.9 8.5 7.8 6.7
1.13 0.76 0.56 0.59 1.19 0.97
South Korea 7.01 7.59 9.03 7.67 6.94 6.57
2.24 1.9 1.18 0.97 0.74 0.60
Philippines 2.29 2.4 2.62 3.18 3.93 4.10
0.42 0.54 0.52 0.43 0.26 0.27
Thailand 2.18 2.31 2.26 2.25 2.55 2.39
2.19 1.88 1.61 1.41 130 1.26
Brazil 0.30 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.43 0.39
2.11 2.49 3.06 2.86 0.94 0.60
Source: MAGIC (1999). Note: Implicit duty rates are shown in the second row.
ACC are competitors in the United States market relative to Latin American countries
mainly in textiles. These textile products encapsulated basical1y under chapter 61 and 62 of the
harmonized code have slightly increased their product share in the United States market. Chapter
61 has increased its market share from 2.1% of aH United States imports in 1997 to 2.4%. In a
similar fashion, chapter 62 has gone from representing 3.0% of aH United States imports in 1997 to
3.1 % in 1998.
Most Latin American countries that export textiles have at least maintained their market
share between 1997 and 1998. Cases in point are El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and
Guatemala. Mexico's share on the other hand has increased from 12% to 13% for products
belonging to both chapter 61 and 62. In addition, the implicit duty rate charged on the impart value
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of these products is higher for Asian countries than for Latin American countries. As an example,
while the duty rate for the Philippines and Indonesia for chapter 62 for the year 1998 is 16% and
18% respectively, it is 13% for Guatemala and 9% for the Dominican Republic. Needless to say,
NAFTA has allowed important taríff reductions for Mexican products. The duty rate applied to
Mexican textiles belonging to both chapters 61 and 62 categories does not surpass 1.5%.
Regarding vehicles and electric machinery both Canada and Mexico are important United
States suppliers. Asian countries, with the exception of Malaysia and South Korea in the chapter
machinery, have a negligible market share. Malaysia and South Korea have in fact lost market share.
e) Import effects
The financial crisis by depressing income can affect the balance-of-trade equilibrium
through its impact on imports. A way to assessthe import effect of a reduction of income for Latin
American and Caribbean countries is to obtain the import elasticity of income. Table 23 presents
the import elasticity of income obtained through statistical techniques for all Central American
countries, Panama. Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
Table 24




















Source: Pérez & Moreno (1999). Based on 1950-1997 data.
From this set of countries Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Nicaragua are more susceptible to
import variation due to income changes than the rest of these countries. Indeed, in the case of Costa
Rica a 1% decrease in income will result in a 1.7% decrease in imports.
Depending on the sensitivity of imports to income, decreases in income can help to restore
balance of trade equilibrium. But if countries are dependent on imported machinery and inputs for




The financial effects of the global crisis centre on capital flows to Latin America, international debt
issues, spreads, and equity price market behaviour. The performance of these indicators reflect the
degree of access to external capital flows. Ultimately,the cost of reduced external finance or the
cost related to an increase in foreign borrowing for a given country will depend on its degree of
vulnerability. Vulnerability is assessed by sovereign credit risk indicators.
a) Capital flows to Latin America
The financial crisis affected the behaviour of capital flows to emerging market economies.
Net prívate flows decreased substantially between 1997 and 1998 and are expected to decrease
further in 1999. While net prívate capital flows will decrease slightly to emerging market
economies (from 143 billion dollars to 140 billion dollars), net official flows are expected to
decrease by 25%. Prívate flows to Latin Ameríca are estimated to have reached 85 billion dollars
by 1998 (106 billion dollars in 1997) and the forecast for 1999 points to further decrease by close to
20 billion dollars. (See table 24 below.)
Table 25
EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES EXTERNAL FINANCING IN PERCENTAGES. 1995-1999
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Total externa! net finance in billions of dollars 270 332 300 194 174
Net private tlows as %of total net external finance 85 99 88 74 81
Latin America as %of total net private tlows 20 32 40 59 47
Private creditors as %of total net externa! finance 46 60 40 11 9.2
Net officia! tlows as %of total net externa! finance 15 1.4 12 26 19.2
Latin America as %of officia! tlows 64 10 39 64
Source: UF (1999).
The reverse side of the coin is the decrease in fixed income market yields in the United
States considered a safe haven in times of monetary and financial turbulence. This reflects
confidence in that the Federal Reserve will not increase interest rates and also expectations of
continued and uninterrupted growth. The flight to quality to fixed income is shown in Graph 7
below by the temporal behaviour of the United States' lO-year treasury bond yield and the spread in
the torporate-treasury bond market (see Graph 7).
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Table 26
LATIN AMERICA'S EXTERNAL FINANCE, 1995-1999
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Total external finance in billions of doIlars 71.4 93.7 102.0 105.1 87.8
Private net flows in billions of doIlars 45.4 104.4 105.9 85.4 66.3
Net Equity Investment in billions of dollars 30.1 49.6 63.9 45.7 47.4
Net Direct Equity in billions of dollars 24.5 36.5 50.9 50.7 40.2
Net Portfolio Equity in billions of dollars 5.5 13.1 13.0 -4.7 7.3
Net Private Creditors 15.4 54.8 42 39.7 18.8
Net Commercial Banks 19.4 21.5 15.3 4.9 1.7
Net Non Banks -4.0 33.3 26.7 34.8 17.1
Net Official Flows 26 -10.7 -3.9 19.7 21.5
Source: UF (1999).
Graph 7: United States' yield on lO-year treasury bond (TBY) and quality spread in the bond
market (QSP), 1996-1999. Monthly Data
I 11 ID IV
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May 97 Nov. 97i Oct. 98 Feb.98
July 98
Source: The Federal Reserve Bank of Sto Louis (1999); Federal Reserve Bank of DaBas (l999) ,Note:
Roman numerals refer to the four phases of the financial crisis referred to aboye. I refers to the Asian
Crisis, II refers to the terms of trade decline, III refers to the Russian crisis. IV refers to the Brazilian
crisis.
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The main explanation for the decrease in foreign flows to Latin America are the cases of
Brazil and Argentina. In the case of Brazil, private net flows are expected to decrease from 36
billion in 1998 dollars to 14 in 1999. Argentina will also experience a decline in flows while
Mexico will register a surge in capital flows. The decomposition of capital into its private and
official components show that the decrease in bank lending is the main cause of the decrease in
capital flows.
Official flows are expected to increase due to disbursements from intemational
organizations. Pero, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina have requested support for further IMF
financing. Peru asked from the IMF for a three-year loan amounting to 383 million SDR 3 (June
1999). In its letter of intent (May, 1999), Argentina requested fund assistance to deal with the
contagion effects of the Russian and Brazilian crises. Mexico's request to the IMF amounted to an
equivalent of 3 109.3 million SDR in the form of a stand-by arrangement until the ertd of the year
2000 (June 1999). Finally, Ecuador was trying to reach an agreement with the IMF for 400 million
dollar loan before August 28, 1999.
Nonetheless, Latin America is expected to maintain its overall weight in global capital flows
to merging market economies and increase its weight of official capital flows. Thus in terms of
levels capital flows are expected to decrease but in terms of their distribution Latin America is
expected a higher share of these (see table 24 aboye). In addition, private net capital flows will still
be aboye the 1995 level but below the 1996 level which marks the retum of capital flows to Latin
America.
In terms of direct foreign investment and within the Latin American region the data for that
while small economies, with the exception of Honduras and Uruguay, have increased their flows of
FDI in 1998, big economies Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil have registered marked increases (see
table 26 below).
The effects of a decrease in foreign direct investment can be briefly analysed with the help
of national accounting identities. 4 These identities indicate that a country is a borrower from the
rest of the world (Le., records negative net foreign asset purchases) when domestic private savings
is not sufficient to finance private investment spending plus government budget deficits. As such,
when the possibilities of attracting surplus foreign savings decrease, the country is forced to narrow
the savings gap (the difference between domestic investment and savings) by curtailing domestic
spending (Le., increase domestic aggregate savings). In tum, the contraction in spending often
IMF's special drawing rights.
4 While national accounting identities are true by definition and thus do not provide a theory
of external or internal accounts nor a theory of direction of causality among the variables considered,
they do provide a starting point for an analysis of possible policy options.
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carried out at the expense of government spending, in sorne cases at the expense of government
capital expenditure, 5 often results in output and ernployrnent reduction 6.
Table 27
ANNUAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT RATE OF GROWTH BY COUNTRY AND
REGIONALTRADE AGREEMENT, 1993-1998
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
CACM
Costa Rica 9.9 20.1 33.1 8.2 14.2 7.9
El Salvador 6.7 -118.4
Guatemala 52.1 -54.5 15.4 2.7 10.4 605.9
Honduras 7.7 -19.2 64.3 30.4 42.2 -21.9
Nicaragua 160 2.6 75. 21.4 103.5 6.9
Average 42.3 -12.8 46.94 -11.14 42.6 149.7
Andean Group
Bolivia 33 21.5 166.0 20.7 26.9 8.5
Colombia 5.9 108.8 29.4 65.1 61.8 -49.4
Ecuador 163.5 13.2 -11.5 -4.9 29.1 30
Peru 392.6 360.3 -33.6 58.3 -37.4 2.00
Venezuela -208.7 126.5 404.4 144.3 175.1 -31.7
Average 77.3 126.0 111.0 56.7 51.1 -8.2
Mercosur
Argentina -18.8 -8.9 -5.2 5.6 36.1 -12.7
Brazil -58.8 154.1 70.8 162.5 103.9 21.0
Paraguay -38.3 31.1 60.8 57.7 -10.2 10.9
Uruguay 52.0 1.3 -12.7 16.8 -3.12
-38.6 57.1 47.0 53.3 36.6 16.0
Source: ECLAC (1999).
5 El Salvador is a case in point.
6 An alternative, and perhaps more long term, option is to create incentives to attract foreign
direct investment. Central American countries have, pursuing economic liberalization impulses, opted
for this route.
During the past five years, besides opening up to external goods competition goods by lowering
tariffs, these countries have begun to allow for competition in the service sector. The recent selling of
telecornmunications firms is a case in point. Additionally sorne Central American countries are trying to
change their foreign direct investment procedures as well as their free trade zone laws to provide greater
incentives for foreign investors such as lowering their fiscal burden. While the end result of this strategy
may take time to materialize, there is always the possibility that it may actually generate important fiscal
imbalances. This in turn may widen the savings gap aggravating thus the current account balance and
furthering the need for private foreign capital flows.
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b) International debt market
The international debt market suffered with unprecedented rapidity the contagion effects of
the financial crisis. lnitially, as pointed out in the IMF International Capital Market Report (1998),
the Asian crisis caused a virtual shutdown for new debt issues in the fourth quarter of 1997.
The Russian crisis led to further fear of illiquidity and to a switch of more liquid
instruments. The decrease in the rate of discount in the United States and in Europe eased the
situation.
The volume of issues was significantly affected by the Russian crisis as their level fell to
that registered during the Mexican crisis. Tables 27 and 28, that show international debt securities
by nationality of issuer and by type of issuer, indicate in the third and fourth quarters of 1998 net
issues for developing countries and Latin America actually decreased.
Table 28
INTERNATIONAL DEBT SECURITIES BY NATIONALITY OF USER.
OUTSTANDING AMOUNT AND NET ISSUES
Outstanding Net issues
1996-1998 1998
1996 1997 1998 I II III IV
World 3 145 3512 4234 180 211 126 75
Developed Countries 2549 2830 3425 145 166 113 62
Developing Countries 231 302 329 7.2 21 -4.2 -2.8
Latin America 113 149 173 8.8 14.0 -0.6 -2.2
Argentina 30 42 54 3.5 6.2 0.9 0.4
Brazil 29 39 41 3.5 4.0 -2.2 -3.0
Chile 3.1 5 6 ... 0.5 ... 0.2
Colombia 3.8 5 7 0.7 0.8 0.5 ...
Mexico 44 51 54 1.2 ... -0.1 0.6
Venezuela 3.4 9 11 ... 2.6 0.2 -0.4
Offshore Centres 35 49 58 1.9 4.3 1.8 0.4
Bahamas 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.1
Bermuda 0.4 0.3 1.4 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.3
Panama ... 1.3 1.6 ... 0.3 ... ...
Source: IFI (1999).
The reduction in access to market finance has made it more difficult for these countries to
manage their external debt. Other alternatives can include placement of securities in the domestic
market. This option is however not without effects on interest rates depending on the balance of
supply and demand for securities. For countries that have opted for fiscal and monetary restraint to
attain the required adjustment, this option can actually result in output and employrnent losses.
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The Brazilian crisis further affected the international debt market with the concomitant
consequences for Latin American economies.
Following the Brazilian crisis spreads on emerging market bonds increased. Graph 5 shows
the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI index) which is a measure of risk for total returns of
traded external debt in emerging markets. In this sense the EMBI serves as a benchmark for
investor confidence. The EMBI registers three surges which correspond to the three crisis
mentioned aboye, the Asian crisis, the Russian crisis and the "Samba Effect." Between August and
December of 1997 the EMBI increased by more than 200 points. It remained stable between
December 1997 and August 1998 reflecting the return of investor animal spirits. Between August
1998 and October 1998, the index reached its peak following the Russian debt default. By January
1999, Brazil's devaluation sent the EMBI to late 1998 levels. Graph 5 also shows the Emerging
Local Market Index (ELMI index) which shows total returns for money market instruments in
merging markets in local currency. As expected the ELMI index is close to being the mirror image
of the EMBI indexo
Table 29
INTERNATIONAL DEBT SECURITIES BY NATIONALITY OF USER AND TYPE
OF ISSUER. OUTSTANDING AMOUNT AND NET ISSUES, 1996-1998
BILLIONS OF US DOLLARS
Outstanding Net issues
1996-1998 1998
1996 1997 1998 I II III IV
WorId
Financia! 1321 1592 1978 110 108 76 28
Government 730 749 906 30 50 27 22
Corporate 784 868 973 16 41 14 10
Developed Countries
Financia! 1249 1507 1886 107 101 78 30
Government 618 603 725 24 33 20 22
Corporate 682 720 815 14 32 16 10
Developing Countries
Financia] 58 64 64 2 4 -5 -3
Government 85 113 132 3.3 10 1 0.4
Corporate 89 125 134 1.7 8 -1 -0.4
Latin America
Financia] 25 28 30 2.9 4 -3.0 -3
Government 50 70 84 4 5 2.5 0.2
Corporate 37 51 58 2 5 -0.1 0.4
Argentina
Financial 4 5 6 0.2 2 -1 -0.1
Government 19 26 36 3 3 2 0.8





Financial 15 17 18 2.3 1.7 -0.8 -2.3
Government 3 7 9 .0.5 1.6 -0.6
Corporate 11 15 15 0.6 0.6 -0.8 -0.7
Chile
Financial 0.4 0.4 0.4
Government
Corporate 3 4 5 0.5 0.2
Colombia
Financial 0.5 0.5 1 0.3 0.3
Government 3 4 5 0.4 0.5 0.7
Corporate 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.6 -0.1
Mexico
Financial 6.0 5.3 3.8 0.1 -0.3 -0.9 -0.4
Government 24 28 28 0.6 -0.3 -0.2
Corporate 13 18 22 0.5 0.3 1.2 1.2
Venezuela
Financial 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.6
Government 1 6 6 -0.1
Corporate 2 3 5 2.1
Offshore Centres
Bahamas
Financial 0.4 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Government
Corporate 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2
Bermuda
Financial 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.3
Government
Corporate 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.4 -0.2 0.3
Panama
Financial 0.1 0.1
Government 1.2 1.5 0.3
Corporate
Source: IFI (1999).
The Brazilian crisis, which has had important effects on Argentina, has led this country to
implicitly announce an increasing risk of debt defauIt. This has had an impact on emerging market
debt as Argentina's external debt is one of the biggest in the region (129 400 million dollars (see
Table 29). By 1999, external debt represented 44% of GDP and the debt service 21 % of its exports
(see Table 30). The recent announcement by Argentina to increase tariffs for textiles on its Latin
American partners have sent further signs of instability to financial markets.
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STOCK OF EXTERNAL DEBT OF ALL MATURITY, 1997-1999.





Costa Rica 3,445 3,156




















Dominican Republic 3,044 2,525
CARICOM








Saint Kitts & Nevis 50 32
Saint Vincent & Grenadines 244 339
Sto Lucia 117 63
Suriname 145 162
Trinidad & Tobago 2,206 1,983



































SOVEREIGN RISK INDICATORS 1999





Argentina 43.7 596.9 21.5 30.4 9.1
Brazil 36.5 325 24 20.8 6.5
Chile 41.2 151.4 8.5 13.1 6.7
Colombia 39.4 230.2 15.4 9.7 5.4
Ecuador 86.8 287.4 17.6 1.5 2.0
Mexico 40.4 118.4 10.7 16.2 1.6
Pero 45.1 376.9 19.5 10.1 9.1
Venezuela 39.2 207 18.3 7.1 9.9
Source: BCP Securities
6. Fiscal effects
An important effect of the fmancial crisis is its deflationary impact on the price of basic cornmodities.
The slack in Asian demand in combination with other factors have reinforced the tendency of basic
export price cornmodities to decrease (see Table 31).
Table 32
BASIC EXPORT COMMODITY PRICES. BASE 1990 = 100
1991-1998
Product 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Sugar 71 72 80 95 106 95 91 75
Banana 109 91 85 84 85 91 109 95
Meat 105 96 103 92 75 70 73 69
Coffee 93 71 79 163 164 136 206 157
Cotton 95 76 77 101 129 110 101 94
Wood 105 114 135 145 147 169 131 110
Petroleum 83 81 71 66 71 86 80 56
Source: ECLA, 1999.
The decrease in the prices of basic cornmodities may possibly result in a contraction output
growth via the terms-of-trade effect. However, according to empirical studies the terms-of-trade effect
seems to be negligible. 7 More important1y, the fall in cornmodity prices may alter the equilibrium of
the fiscal accounts; especially in those cases where governmental budget equilibrium depends to an
7 At least for the Central American case the terms of trade play a minor role in determining
GDP. See, Moreno-Brid, 1999.
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important extent on the export price behaviour of these goods. In addition, decreases in income that
have resulted from the fmancial crisis, can have important fiscal effects when governmental revenues
depend to a large extent of import taxes.
The options for restoring the equilibrium in the fiscal accounts can be illustrated by referring to
a simple government budget identity. This accounting relationship states that government expenditures
on goods and services plus interest payments on government debt must be fmanced by tax revenues,
money creation or indebtedness. In small Latin American and Caribbean economies, governments have
little leeway to increase direct taxes and generally tend to increase indirect taxes,(Le., value added
tax). Even so, increasing indirect taxation is an unpopular and sometimes difficult measure to
undertalce.
An alternative option to restore budget equilibrium is greater indebtedness, which in small
economies refers to foreign debt. Yet, leaving aside official aid, it becomes difficult to borrow when
countries are faced with capital outflows.
Thus the main policy options available are to decrease government expenditure or to increase
the money supply. Either by contracting output and employment or by increasing prices both options
have important costs.
Table 32 shows the weight of total trade tax revenue, import tax revenue and export tax
revenue as a percentage of total tax revenue at three points in time for Latin American and
Caribbean countries. The countries are also grouped at the lower end of the table by regional bloc
formation.
In most cases the importance of trade taxes for fiscal revenue has decreased. Exceptions to
this trend are Nicaragua and Paraguay. In sorne cases trade taxes have registered only slight
decreases. Cases in point are the Bahamas, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. In terms of
regional trade bloc formation all blocs have lowered their fiscal dependence on trade taxes. Taking
as comparison points reference year 1 and reference year 3, Mercosur has decreased the fiscal
weight of trade taxes from 9% in reference year 1 to 5% in year 3. Similarly the Andean
Cornmunity has lowered the trade tax fiscal revenue ratio from 17% to 8%. The CACM has
followed a similar line: 21 % in reference year 1 and 18% in reference year 3.
Among trade taxes the most significant reduction is without doubt the decline in export taxes.
In the case of Central American countries while export taxes that at the start of 1980 represented close
to 2% of GDP and 40% of all tax revenues declined by 1997 to 0.07% of GDP and 0.02% of all tax
revenues. In this sense the decline in basic cornmodity prices does not pose a danger to fiscal
equilibrium.
This decline in the vulnerability of fiscal revenues to external shocks has to a greater extent
resulted from a trade liberalization strategy. This strategy has in fact, under this scenario, allowed
Central American countries to avoid the choice between unemployment and inflation to restore its
budget balance. However, this maneuver margin is reduced by the fact that import taxes represent still
17%of tax revenue for Central American countries and 8%for the Andean Cornmunity.
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Table 33
TOTAL TRADE TAX REVENUE (TIl), IMPORT TAX REVENUE (IM1), EXPORT TAX REVENUE (EXT)
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FISCAL REVENUE FOR THREE REFERENCE YEARS
BY COUNTRY AND TRADE BLOC
Reference year 1 Reference year 2 Reference year 3
TIT IMT EXT TIT IMT EXT TIT IMT EXT
Argentina
86/90/95 12.03 5.38 5.27 14.12 2.30 8.32 5.22 4.41 0.10
Bahamas
85/90/93 59.61 55.48 0.86 64.62 57.94 1.26 58.98 47.48 1.54
Bolivia
87/90/96 15.44 11.65 3.73 6.88 6.88 5.76 5.76
Brazil
85/90/93 2.33 1.50 0.90 1.52 1.49 0.03 1.50 1.50
Colombia
85/90/94 16.35 14.22 2.11 19.86 18.22 1.63 8.20 8.20
Costa Rica
86/90/95 21.06 13.01 7.95 22.95 15.53 6.86 14.89 11.55 2.60
Chile
87/90/96 10.30 10.30 11.60 9.30
Ecuador*
85/90/94 17.46 14.29 1.06 13.29 11.81 0.34 11.27 10.41
El Salvador*
87/90/96 26.13 9.62 16.48 21.77 14.10 7.62 12.33 12.22
Guatemala*
86/90/95 27.99 9.88 15.19 19.58 19.34 0.17 22.96 22.29
Grenada*
91/93/95 24.51 18.56 0.01 19.69 16.81 0.01 16.77 16.77
Mexico
86/90/95 6.02 5.62 0.40 6.24 6.18 0.07 3.99 3.96 0.02
Nicaragua
85/90/95 6.90 4.68 0.12 18.61 18.59 0.02 20.56 20.56
Panama
86/90/95 11.69 10.76 0.77 11.97 10.92 0.93 0.52
Paraguay
85/90/93 11.33 9.86 0.01 20.01 14.01 12.46 12.46
Peru
87/90/96 21.54 21.18 0.36 16.67 9.29 7.23 9.02 9.02
Trinidad & Tobago
93/94/95 8.83 4.59 7.32 7.32 5.58 5.58
Uruguay
87/90/96 11.90 9.11 0.25 9.43 7.70 0.54 3.48 3.20 0.03
Venezuela
87/90/96 12.72 12.72 5.70 6.90 6.90
Dominican Republic
85/90/95 30.2 26.4 2.1 32.1 20.4 0.1 27.7 26.8 0.4
Total Average 17.06 13.44 3.39 17.2 14.38 2.34 13.52 12.72 0.75
MERCOSUR 9.40 6.46 1.61 11.27 6.38 2.96 5.06 5.39 0.06
Andean Community 16.70 14.81 1.81 12.48 11.55 3.07 8.23 8.06
CACM 20.52 9.30 9.94 20.73 16.89 3.67 17.68 16.65
Source: Government Finance Statistics, IMF (1997).
Note: *Related ta the budgetary central gavernment; aH the rest are related to the consolidated central government.
Not available; (-) zero; a blank means absence of data.
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7. Conclusion
The global financial crisis which started in Asia has registered unprecedented contagion effects
throughout the world. In particular, it has higWighted the fragility of macroeconomic fundamentals
of important countries such as Russia or Brazil.
Regional trade agreements have shown, despite their renewed impetus in the early 1990's,
to be vulnerable to macroeconomic fluctuations. Through direct or indirect transmission
mechanisms these can alter the volume and direction of trade among trade partners. AIso trade
liberalization cornmitments may suffer when the external conditions that propitiated these
cornmitments are prone to unforeseen alterations. This has recently been the case with Mercosur as
Argentina has announced trade barriers to protect its exchange rate regime.
It is thus important, in the stages of formalizing a trade agreement that would involve the
entire region, to analyse the effects of the global financial crisis. The effects are threefold: balance
of trade effects, financial effects and fiscal effects.
The balance-of-trade effects comprise an external demand effect and a real exchange rate
effect that translates into increasing competition from East Asian countries in export markets.
Available data show that the external demand effect was not significant. In addition, an empirical
product-by-product analysis of the United States import market shows that Asian Countries do not
pose a competitive threat to Latin American and Caribbean countries. In particular in terms of
implicit tariffduties, Latin American and Caribbean countries have preferential access to the United
States import market. This may have compensated East Asia's increase in external competitiveness
due to real exchange rate devaluations.
The fmancial effects are centred in the reduction in the availability of capital inflows mostly
due to the reduction in cornmercial bank lending. This has resulted in internal monetary and fiscal
adjustment with the concomitant costs in terms of foregone output and employment as was
evidenced by Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Pero and more recently Brazil.
While official flows have compensated part of this decline, Latin American and Caribbean
countries will have to find alternative sources of external finandng. This may put additional
pressure on interest rates.
The fiscal effect refers to the dependency of budget equilibrium on import and export taxes.
For a given import elasticity of income, decreases in income result in decreases in import revenue.
Also, Latin American countries show a high dispersion of fiscal dependence on import tax revenue.
Thus while for the Mercosur the ratio of import taxes to total government revenue is 5%, for the
CACM it is 16%. This is probably the result of an increase in the import base that has more than
compensated the decrease in import tariff rates due to trade liberalisation policies.
Finally, the crisis, in its second stage, has reinforced the decrease in demand for basic
export cornmodities. Through this channel it had an important fiscal impact for those countries in
which government revenues depend on the price behaviour of these cornmodities. üil exporting
countries provide a case in point. üther countries such as Central American countries have become,




MEXICAN IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND THE CARIBBEAN
BY COUNTRY AND REGIONAL BLOC. MARKET SHARE, 1993-1998
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Central Ameríca
Costa Rica 0.033 0.035 0.022 0.064 0.07 0.07
El Salvador 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Guatemala 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.065
Honduras 0.010 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.01
Nicaragua 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.01 0.01
Total 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.18
Mercosur
Argentina 0.39 0.42 0.26 0.34 0.22 0.21
Brazil 1.84 1.55 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.83
Paraguay 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.02 0.01 0.001
Uruguay 0.066 0.071 0.024 0.04 0.032 0.025
Total 2.3 2.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1
- Andean Community
Bolivia 0.025 0.024 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.007
Colombia 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.12
Ecuador 0.057 0.11 0.095 0.07 0.05 0.06
Peru 0.26 0.27 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.11
Venezuela 0.35 0.38 0.30 0.26 0.38 0.24
Total 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5
CARICOM
Antigua & Barbuda 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bahamas 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Barbados 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Belize 0.01 0.01 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
Dominica 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Grenada 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Guyana 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jamaica 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.005
Saint Kitts & Nevis 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Saint Vincent &
Grenadines 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
St Lucia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Suriname 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Trinidad & Tobago 0.039 0.057 0.093 0.061 0.057 0.036
Total 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.04
Source: ECLAC (1999), DOTS Yearbook, IMF (1999).
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